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Tom Regan, All That Dwell Therein: Essays on and�Animal Rights  
Environmental Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press,1982)� 
{A Second Opinion} 
This is a book of ten essays, more 
than half previously published in phi­
losophy journals, but it nevertheless 
forms a coherent whole and pays 
reading straight through. Each essay 
is preceded by an introduction written 
for this volume, which helpfully places 
the essay in context and cites articles 
critical of it· that have been pub­
lished. Professor Regan is an 
extremely precise and lucid writer. 
He describes his style in one essay as 
"G. E. Moorish," and this description 
may to some extent be applied to all 
the book's most significant philosophi­
cal essays. Some of the other essays, 
which were written for lay audiences, 
are lighter, and one is even moving in 
its description of specific animal 
abuses. 
Professor Regan's aim in these 
essays is to establish the concept of 
animal rights as the basis of our moral 
obligation not to inflict unnecessary 
suffering and death upon animals. He 
argues that utilitarianism is inadequate 
for this purpose because it on occa­
sion permits treatment of animals that 
violates our intuitive notions of moral­
ity. Essentially, this is because utili­
tarianism allows suffering and death to 
be inflicted on animals whenever the 
resulting benefits even slightly out­
weigh the suffering and death. The 
concept of animal rights, on the other 
hand, Regan argues, would preclude 
the infliction of suffering and death 
on animals except possibly when the 
resulting benefits vastly outweigh the 
harm. In addition, the calculations 
127 
required by utilitarianism are often 
difficult, if not impossible, to make. 
Regan's essential thesis is that it 
is reasonable to believe that all 
humans have certain natural rights, 
and that, if they do, the grounds 
upon wh ich they do entail that at 
least some animals also· have these 
rights. (The term "all humans" 
should be understood to exclude those 
.who are irreversibly comatose.) 
Regan employs (and refines) the so­
called argument from marginal cases, 
marginal cases being severely retarded 
and other "non-paradigmatic" human 
beings. The argument essentially is 
that if all humans have certain natural 
rights, these must stem from some­
thing in the nature of all humans. 
Qualities such as rationality and lan­
guage are not possessed by all 
humans, so cannot serve as a basis 
for natural rights for all humans. 
Other qualities, such as having inter­
ests and having intrinsic worth, are 
possessed by all humans, so may fu r­
nish a foundation for human rights. 
Now, although animals generally do 
not have rationality and language, 
they generally do have interests and 
intrinsic worth. Therefore, the qual­
ities adequate to furnish a basis for 
natu ral rights for humans also estab­
lish the same natural rights for ani­
mals. 
In short, there are no morally rel­
evant differences between the severely 
retarded and animals. This, of 
cou rse, leaves us the option to treat 
the severely retarded the way we 
currently treat animals (eat them, 
shoot them for sport, etc.), but 
Regan is counting on our not embrac­
ing this option. 
Regan's case for animal rights is 
presented primarily in two of the 
essays in this book, "The Moral Basis 
of Vegetarianism," and "An Examina­
tion and Defense of One Argument 
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Concerning Animal Rights." In the 
fi rst essay, which was written earlier, 
Regan argues that meat-eati ng is 
wrong because it ordinarily results in 
the violation of two natural rights 
that, if possessed by all humans, are 
also possessed by at least some ani­
mals. The fi rst is the equal natu ral 
right to be spared undeserved pain, 
which derives from the fact that all 
humans and at least some animals have 
interests. The second is the equal 
natural right to life, which derives 
from the fact that all humans and at 
least some animals have intrinsic 
worth. Thus, Regan argues, if we 
agree that, based on their having 
interests, all humans have a right to 
be spared. undeserved pain, then we 
must agree that at least some animals, 
since they also have interests, have 
the same right. Similarly, if we agree 
that, based on thei r intri nsic worth, 
all humans have a right to life, then 
we must grant the same right to ani­
mals with intrinsic worth. 
In the later essay, "An Examination 
and Defense of One Argument Con­
cerning Animal Rights," Regan drops 
the qualities of having interests and 
instrinsic worth as a basis for rights 
and relies solely upon the quality of 
having inherent value. He also does 
not specify the particular rights that 
derive from having inherent value, 
except to say that they are basic 
moral rights. He does, however, 
suggest that one may be the right not 
to be made to suffer gratuitously. 
Presumably another may be the right 
to life, and, since the right not to be 
made to suffer gratuitously sounds the· 
same as the right to be spa red unde­
served suffering, it appears that 
Regan probably still accepts the two 
rights for. which he argued in the 
first essay. He has, however, altered 
their foundation, to which we will 
return later. In summary, the natu­
ral rights Regan asserts and thei r 
foundations appear to be as follows: 
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ESSAY RIGHT FOUNDATION 
"The Moral Basis of to be spared undeserved suffering having interests 
Vegetarianism" 
to life intrinsic worth 
"An Examination and basic moral rights 
Defense of One 
Argument Concerning 
Animal Rights" 
Peter Singer, in Animal Liberation 
and in Practical Ethics, also relied 
upon the argument from marginal 
cases, but, as a utilitarian, he did 
not posit rights. Rather, he argued 
that all sentient humans and animals, 
on the basis of their sentience, are 
entitled to have thei r interests 
weighed equally when one determines 
the morality of an act that affects 
them. Why doesn't Regan use senti­
ence, instead of the more complicated 
notions of having interests, instrinsic 
worth, and inherent value, to estab­
lish animal rights? In the case of the 
right to life, sentience clearly does 
not supply an adequate basis because 
life can be taken· painlessly. Singer 
in fact concedes that meat-eati ng is 
not immoral under some circumstances 
if an animal is permitted to live a 
normal life and is killed painlessly. 
In the case of the right to be 
spared undeserved suffering (or not 
to be made to suffer gratuitously), it 
seems that sentience might suffice as 
a foundation. But here we must first 
consider Regan's use of the concepts 
he prefers: "interests," "intrinsic 
worth," and "inherent value." In 
"The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," 
Regan defines interests to include 
such items as "liking-disliking, lov­
ing-hating, hoping-fearing, desiring­
avoiding" (p. 14). Here Regan seems 
inherent value 
to be on shaky ground. He is lump­
ing together states of mind of varying 
levels of sophistication, and it is con­
troversial which ones animals possess. 
Animals' rights, it is hoped, do not 
depend on the extent to which animals 
have the states of mind that Regan 
defines as constituting "interests." 
Of course, Regan could reduce these 
states of mind to forms of feeling 
pleasu re and pain ~ but then he would 
be equating "having interests" with 
sentience. Regan, however, appar­
ently does not co.nsider sentience an 
adequate foundation for the right to 
be spared undeserved suffering. 
Perhaps this is because he wants to 
avoid saying that an imals have a right 
to be spared undeserved pain because 
it is undeserved and painful. But 
this seems the only alternative unless 
he is prepared to prove that animals 
have relative sophisticated states of 
consciousness. 
As for the foundation, in "The 
Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," of the 
right to life, Regan identifies the 
notion of "intrinsic worth" with exist­
ing as an end in oneself. A person is 
an end in himself if he has "various 
positive interests, such as desires, 
goals, hopes, preferences and the 
like" (p. 30). The right to life 
derives from the fact that these inter­
ests can not be satisfied if one is 
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dead. Here again Regan· is lumping 
varying states of consciousness 
together, and the degree to which 
animals have these states seems quite 
controversial. BLjt, here, reducing 
these states of mi nd to sentience 
clearly will not do, because the right 
Regan is attempting to derive from 
"intrinsic worth" is the right to life, 
and lives, as noted, can be taken 
without the victims' suffering. 
Therefore, it appears that unless 
Regan can prove that animals have 
relatively soph isticated states of con­-
sciousness, he has not shown that 
. animals have a right to life. 
In "An Examination and Defense of 
One Argument Concerning Animal 
Rights," Regan derives basic moral 
rights from inherent value. For an 
individual to have inherent value, he 
says, is to have value logically inde­-
pendent of any other being's happen­-
ing to take an interest in or otherwise 
valuing the individual. An individu­-
al's inherent value, Regan claims, 
does not stem from sentience or from 
having interests; rather, it stems 
from the fact that certain forms of life 
are better or worse for the individual 
whose life it it, as opposed to anyone 
else. Regan suggests that all humans 
who a re not irreversibly comatose 
have Iives that can be. better or worse 
for them, and therefore have inherent 
value. If this is the case, then the 
argument from marginal cases proves 
that at least some an imais also have 
inherent value. 
A problem with this line of reason­-
ing is that to say that an individual 
has a life that is better or worse for 
the particular individual seems to be 
reducible to saying that the individual 
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is sentient. To say that a non-sen­-
tient being, such as a plant or an 
irreversibly comatose human, has a 
i ife that can be better or worse for 
itself, would be to remove all meaning 
from the words "for itself." All a 
plant has IS a life, and what 
distinguishes it from a being that 
might be said to have a life for itself 
is that the plant lacks sentience. We 
therefore are in the same position with 
"inherent value" as we were with 
"having interests" and "intrinsic 
worth." The only state of mind that 
no reasonable person can deny that 
most animals have is sentience, and it 
is difficult, Regan believes, to estab- . 
lish rights based on sentience. 
It is difficult to establish rights 
based on sentience, but it is also dif­-
ficult to establish rights based on 
qualities that only humans, or prima­-
rily humans, possess. Therefore, 
whether, if humans have natural 
rights, then animals have them, may 
be a moot question. Establishing ani­-
mals' rights, however, wou Id be very 
desirable, because of the serious 
problems with utilitarianism, both in 
its application and results. It is 
therefore not intended to denigrate 
Regan's efforts by noting some of the 
problems in his attempts to establish 
an imais' rights. Th is book undoub­-
tedly represents the most sign ificant 
sustained attempt that has occured, 
and if it has not completely suc­-
ceeded, this may be because its goal 
is unattainable. At the very least it 
should provide a valuable focal point 
for future consideration of the sub':' 
ject, and should take its place along­-
side Peter Singer's works as the most 
important and original in the field. 
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